| SINGAPORE | HIGH COURT - SUIT NOs 846 and 848 of 1992 |
| Judges |
LAI KEW CHAI J |
| Date | 29 AUG 1994 |
| Citation | [1995] 1 SLR 115 |
Unincorporated Associations—Societies—Legal personality—Whether an entity with legal attributes distinct from members—Whether can sue and be sued in its own name—Societies Act (Cap 311) s 35(b)
Torts—Defamation—Registered societies—Whether entitled to protection of good name and reputation as a legal entity—Societies Act (Cap 311) s 35(b)
Statutory Interpretation—Aids to construction—English cases on interpretation of similar statutes—Significance of such cases—Relevant only to show approach of courts as a matter of construction and inference—Societies Act (Cap 311)
The defendants were sued by the plaintiffs for defamation. The defendants argued before the senior assistant registrar that the plaintiffs had no locus to sue in their own name as they were a society, an unincorporated association. The registrar allowed the plaintiffs` action to proceed to trial. The defendants appealed.
The questions raised were (a) whether a society, being an unincorporated association but registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) (the Act), has a separate legal personality from its members; if so, (b) whether a society is capable in law of being defamed; and (c) interpretation of s 35(b) of the Act.
Held , dismissing the appeals:
(1).The presence of s 35(b) in the Act confers on registered societies sufficient juridical significance and personification such that they have a good name and reputation as a legal entity and is entitled to the protection of the law of defamation no less than a natural person or legal entity.
(2).English case law on the capacity of registered associations to sue and be sued based on the construction of English statutes is of little assistance in the construction of s 35(b) of the Act, except to show the approach of the courts as a matter of construction and inference.
Cases referred to
Cases Referred To (Precedents)
Cases):
Cur Adv Vult This case has to do with what is in law regarded as a legal entity with legal attributes under which rights are held and liabilities are owed. Such an entity is sometimes referred to as a legal person. It may be said that a person in law is any being or entity who or which in the eyes of the law is capable of enjoying rights or is subject to duties, both of which are enforceable at law. The paradigmatic example of a legal person is a natural person or a human being, though even in this obvious example this has not always been the case because in many ancient, and indeed not so ancient, legal systems, for instance, under Roman law at one time, slaves or foreigners were not recognized as having rights. Slaves were in law treated as property of other masters or objects of rights. Foreigners and their property were liable to be seized by a Roman citizen as though they were without owners. At the same time, in our legal
system, companies incorporated under our Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Ed) and the many and varied corporations which are incorporated by a series of statutes, are recognized by law as legal persons with all the rights, liabilities and, sometimes, certain immunities.
While it is commonplace that such companies and statutory corporations are legal persons, societies registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) are not incorporated and the extent of its legal personality has, for the first time, been questioned in this case. The question for determination in this case is whether a society registered under the Societies Act has a legal personality which is capable in law of being defamed. If it does not have the necessary legal attributes, this action must fail in limine. If it does, the action shall proceed to trial.
In my view, the answer to the question depends on a true and natural interpretation of the provisions of the Societies Act and also on a review of the English case law which had to grapple with the legal personality of associations such as trade unions and friendly societies. Such associations were and are registered under English statutes which have analogous, though not exactly similar, provisions nor analogous statutory framework as those of our Societies Act. The underlying principles of the law of status and of persons, however, are the same.
The legislative history of the Societies Act should be appreciated against the social matrix of Singapore in early 1889 and the indecisiveness of the then legislative council of the Straits Settlements. In spite of the existence of a large number of secret societies, 1,122 officers and 62,376 members enrolled in the registration book (see App 22 to Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements 1888, laid before the council on 12 December 1888), the passage of the first Societies Ordinance in 1889 met with strong and emotional opposition. Mr Shelford, in voting against the Bill, castigated it as a `despotic measure`. He was obviously a firm believer in the absolute freedom of association. The Ordinance had to be passed as one of the measures to suppress the unlawful activities of secret societies.
The 1889 Ordinance and the present Societies Act (Cap 311) provide that every society as defined which was not registered was unlawful. A society, though registered but was actually formed for an unlawful purpose, is still unlawful. The Societies Act has a number of provisions which regulate the constitutions of societies. For present purposes, I should set out in full the whole of s 35. It provides: (b) every such society may sue or be sued in the name in which it was registered under this Act; (c) a writ of summons or other legal process may be served on a society by
serving it on an officer of the society, or by leaving it at, or sending it by registered post to, the registered address of the society; (d) except as otherwise provided in section 36, no judgment in any suit against a registered society shall be put into force against the person or property of any officer or member of the society but only against the property of the society; (e) any member who is in arrears of subscriptions which, according to the rules of the society, he is bound to pay, or who takes possession or detains any property of the society contrary to those rules, or who injures or destroys any property of the society, may be sued for the arrears or for the damage accruing from his wrongful possession, detention, injury or destruction of that property by and in the name of the society; (f) any member of the society who steals, purloins or embezzles any money or other property, or wilfully and maliciously destroys or injures any property of the society, or forges any deed, bond, security for money, receipt or other instrument whereby the funds of the society may be exposed to loss, shall be subject to the same prosecution, and, if convicted, shall be liable to be punished in like manner as any person, not a member, would be subject and liable to in respect of the like offence; (g) in the absence of any specific provision in the rules of a society any number not less than three-fifths of the members for the time being resident in Singapore of the society may determine that it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at a time agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society and its claims and liabilities according to the rules of the society applicable thereto, and if none, then as the governing body finds expedient: Provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the members of the governing body or the members of the society, the adjustment of its affairs shall
be referred to the High Court, and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it thinks fit; (h) no society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members so resident as aforesaid have expressed a wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person or by proxy at a general meeting convened for the purpose.
It is not necessary to discuss each paragraph. Section 35(d) in terms protects the members and officers of a registered society. It says that a judgment against a society shall be enforced against the property of the society, and not that of its members or officers. It reiterates the common law rule that a member of an unincorporated association, in the absence of the rules to the contrary, is under no liability to pay anything to the association or any other person beyond his annual subscription: .
In my judgment, and having regard to the analyses of case law later in this judgment, it is of the utmost importance in this case to keep our eyes on the provisions of s 35(b). In my opinion, its presence in the Societies Act confers on registered societies sufficient juridical significance and personification such that they have a good name and reputation as a legal entity and is entitled to the protection of the law of defamation no less than a natural person or legal entity.
In the course of arguments I was told, and as far as I am aware, the issue before me was never raised. It was not even mentioned in the well-known case of . Chua J was, in my respectful view, unquestionably right when he expressed the view that the Societies Act did not create a body corporate. But the defendant in that case never put in issue whether a registered society had the `quasi-corporate` personality or legal personality so as to have a reputation to protect and to sue for any defamation against it. In the only other relevant local case of , the club, at the sole initiative of its chairman, filed an originating summons seeking a declaration that the defendants were deemed to have automatically retired from being officers and/or general committee members, delivery up of the club`s books and an injunction. It failed. The main issue was whether the club, which was registered under the Societies Act, could be the plaintiff and sue the defendants. At p 283, Chua J
stated
thus:
Counsel for the club, P Suppiah, failed to draw the court`s attention to the express provisions under s 35(b) of the Societies Act and it was conceded before me that for that reason the defendants in the present case could not rely on it.
Under English trade union laws and the Friendly Societies Act, there are provisions for such registered associations to sue and be sued. The prevailing opinion before was that the effect of these provisions seemed to be to make these associations legal entities distinct from their members. Much earlier and in , the House of Lords construed the relevant trade union laws and inferred that a trade union could be sued in tort in its name. Lord Halsbury stated, as recorded at p 436:
In the end, a proper analysis of English case law must mark it off from the construction of what is a local statute; they are of little assistance except to show the approach of the courts as a matter of construction and inference.
In the result, the defendants` appeals against the senior assistant registrar`s decisions are dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
Torts—Defamation—Unincorporated association registered under Societies Act—Whether having the necessary legal personality to sue for libel—Societies Act (Cap 311)
Unincorporated Associations—Societies—Legal personality—Whether registered society an entity with legal attributes distinct from members—Whether capable of suing and being sued in its own name
The respondents, the Central Christian Church, were an unincorporated association registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) (the Act). In two separate actions, they sued the appellants, who were the editors, publishers and printers of the Lian He Wan Bao and The New Paper respectively, alleging libel in respect of certain articles in those publications. The appellants took out summons-in-chambers in the two actions claiming that the statements of claim be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1990 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that they did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, were frivolous and vexatious and were an abuse of the process of the court. The sole issue was whether the respondents had the necessary legal personality to sue for libel. The applications were dismissed by the senior assistant registrar and appeals to the judge were dismissed. (See [1995] 1 SLR 115.) The
appellants then appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Held , dismissing the appeals:
(1).The proper approach in interpreting the Act was to discern from the totality of its provisions whether Parliament intended that an unincorporated association of individuals registered under s 4 thereof as a society should have legal personality such that the society was capable of having an identity separate and distinct from the members who comprise it and be capable of suing or being sued in its registered name even without the aid of s 35(b), which allowed any society registered under the Societies Act to sue or to be sued in the name in which it was registered (see pp 321B-D, 322G-H); The Taff Vale Railway Co v The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426, National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian & Ors [1946] KB 81, Longdon-Griffiths v Smith & Ors [1951] 1 KB 295, Bonsor v Musicians` Union [1955] 3 All ER 518 followed.
(2).It was clear from the totality of the provisions of the Act that an unincorporated association registered as a `society` under the Act had sufficient legal personality such that, in effect, the provisions of the Act had created a `near-corporation` or a `quasi-corporation`. On the facts of the case before the court, there was no reason why a registered society could not sue or be sued for defamation (see pp 324G-325B); National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian & Ors [1946] KB 81, Bonsor v Musicians` Union [1955] 3 All ER 518 followed.
Cases Referred To (Precedents)
Cases):
Cur Adv Vult (delivering the judgment of the court): These two appeals, which we heard together, raise an important question of law. It is whether the Central Christian Church, the respondents in both appeals, have the necessary legal personality or are persona legalis to enable them to sue for libel in respect of two publications, one in the Lian He Wan Bao dated 23 November 1991 (CA 60/95) and the other in The New Paper also dated 23 November 1991 (CA 61/95), which the respondents allege were defamatory of them. This question was answered in the affirmative both by the senior assistant registrar and on appeal from him, by the learned judge. [See [1995] 1 SLR 115.]!
The question arose in this way. The respondents who are an unincorporated association registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) commenced separate actions against the editors, publishers and printers of the Lian He Wan Bao and The New Paper , to whom we will collectively refer as `the appellants`, alleging that in the publications referred to above the respondents had been described as `cult organizations` who might organize `harmful activities here` and who `stretch the truth and have "exclusive" practices.` It is not necessary to refer to the pleadings any further. The appellants then took out a summons-in-chambers in the two actions claiming that the statements of claim be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the ground that they did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the appellants, were frivolous and vexatious and were an abuse
of the process of the court.
Both summonses-in-chambers were heard together by the senior assistant registrar as were the appeals from him by the learned judge. The sole question, at least before the learned judge as framed by him in his judgment, was `whether a society registered under the Societies Act has a legal personality which is capable in law of being defamed.` Before us, counsel for the appellants framed three issues as follows: (a) Whether an unincorporated association registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) (registered society) has a legal personality separate from that of its members by virtue of its registration. (b) Whether a registered society has a reputation capable of being defamed. (c) Whether s 35(b) of the Societies Act is in reality a procedural provision which does not in any way affect the substantive law in respect of the tort of defamation.
Although issue (b) was not specifically raised as an issue before the learned judge and notwithstanding that counsel for the respondents objected to it being raised as an issue before us, we allowed it to be raised as, in our view, it was a corollary of the question before the learned judge, that is to say whether the respondents, a society registered under the Societies Act, were capable in law of being defamed. Issue (c) may be considered a sub-issue under issue (a) as it was contended in the court below and so held by the learned judge that one of the indicia which gave a registered society legal personality was s 35(b) of the Societies Act which gave the registered society the right to sue or be sued in its name, whereas the appellants contended that s 35(b) was in reality a procedural provision which did not give any substantive rights to the registered society.
The approach taken by the learned judge in determining the question put to him, in our view, is eminently correct. In his judgment he said:
We will begin by considering the legal status of unincorporated associations under the common law. It is a settled principle of the common law, of which there can be no doubt, that an unincorporated association consisting of a mere aggregate of individuals is not a legal entity. Lord Buckmaster, Lord Chancellor, in London Association for Protection of Trade & Anor v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15, referring to the association said:
In Electrical, Electronics, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1980] 1 All ER 1097, to which we will refer as the `the EETPU case`, O`Connor J referring to the common law position of unincorporated associations in the context of the tort of libel said at p 1099:
But Parliament can clothe an unincorporated association with legal personality or make it persona legalis and vest it with powers, generally or with limitations, to enable it to sue or to be sued in its own name, either in contract or in tort which of course includes an action of defamation. It cannot be gainsaid that a trade union consisting of an aggregate of individuals formed for the purpose of protecting or advancing their individual or collective rights in trade and industry is an unincorporated association. But the trade union was an unincorporated association with a difference unlike the Longbeach Anglers` Association referred to by O`Connor J in the EETPU case. The former being an association of individuals in the restraint of trade was unlawful whereas the latter formed in the pursuit of leisure and recreation was lawful.
In 1871 the English Parliament passed the Trade Union Act 1871, providing for the registration of trade unions and the legalization of such registered trade unions; `but they were without question unincorporated associations, and as such one would have thought that they could neither sue in their own names, nor be sued, and as such could not be defamed in their proper name` as O`Connor J observed in the EETPU case at p 1100.
In 1901 the question of whether a trade union registered under the Trade Union Act of 1871 and the amending Act of 1876 may be sued in its registered name came for consideration before the English Courts in the case of The Taff Vale Railway Co v The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426. It will be noted that the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876 did not contain any specific provision that the trade union may sue, or be sued in its registered name. Notwithstanding that, Farwell J at first instance and the House of Lords held that The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants could be sued in its registered name.
The Taff Vale Railway Co had sought an injunction against The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, its general secretary and the organizing secretary from picketing the premises of the railway company for the purpose of persuading or preventing those working for the railway company from entering the premises of the railway company in connection with their employment. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants applied to the court for its name to be struck out as a defendant on the ground that it being neither a corporation nor an individual could not be sued in a quasi-corporate or any other capacity. Farwell J whose judgment was highly commended by their Lordships in the House of Lords, and is most instructive to us, addressed himself as follows at pp 427-428:
At p 429 Farwell J continued as follows:
Farwell J then concluded at p 430 that a trade union could be sued for tort. He said:
In the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor, Earl of Halsbury was content to adopt Farwell J`s judgment. Lord Macnaghten at p 439 said:
Lord Shand at p 441 said:
Lord Brampton said in p 442:
Only Lord Lindley demurred somewhat. He said in p 445:
The corollary of the conclusion reached by Farwell J and the House of Lords in Taff Vale is that a trade union may also sue in its registered name. It will further be noted that the Societies Act by s 35(b) provides that `every such society may sue or be sued in the name in which it was registered under this Act` (ie the Societies Act (Cap 311)); but we will return to analyse the Societies Act in detail later.
Before looking further it is just as well to look, briefly, at another English statute which has dealt with another unincorporated association as dealt with by the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. The Friendly Societies Act 1896, is one such statute. In Longdon-Griffiths v Smith & Ors [1951] 1 KB 295, four trustees of a friendly society had prepared a report on the activities of the plaintiff, general secretary of the society, which was read out by one of them at a general meeting of the society, the occasion being one of qualified privilege. Each of the trustees had a right and a duty independent of the other to publish the report. It contained statements defamatory of the plaintiff. One of the four trustees was actuated by malice. The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the trustees both in their personal capacity and as trustees. It was held that an action for libel against a friendly society must be brought against it in its registered name and the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment against the defendants as trustees of the society. The Taff Vale case was applied. We have referred to this case to illustrate that trade unions are not in a special position and different from other unincorporated associations which under the relevant statute applicable to them provides for their registration.
We next refer to National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian & Ors [1946] KB 81. In this case the Court of Appeal affirming Birkett J applied the Taff Vale case and held that a trade union could sue for libel in its registered name. The defendants had argued that a trade union was neither a natural person nor a corporation and hence had no powers and no existence except what was conferred in express terms by Parliament in the relevant statutes affecting registered trade unions. This argument was rejected by Scott LJ, who said at p 85:
He then referred to several provisions of the Trade Union Act 1871, already discussed in the judgment of Farwell J and in the speeches of their Lordships in the House of Lords in passages from the Taff Vale case we have cited, and concluded in pp 85 and 86 as follows:
Uthwatt J referring to the Taff Vale case said at p 88:
... It is well established that in certain cases a trading corporation may bring a suit in respect of an imputation on its trading reputation, and I see no reason why a non-trading corporation should not have the same rights as respects imputations on the conduct by it of its activities. A trade union to my mind stands in the same position. It, too, has its reputation. Why should it not be protected? The social duty so to conduct the affairs of the union as not to invite well-founded criticism is hardly forwarded by a denial of the right to seek redress for an unjustified disparagement of its activities.
Scott LJ expressed a similar opinion. He said at p 87:
The next case of importance is Bonsor v Musicians` Union [1955] 3 All ER 518, although the issue was whether Bonsor, a member of the Musicians` Union, could sue the union in its registered name in contract for being wrongfully expelled from the union. The House of Lords by a majority held that the union was capable of being sued for damages for breach of contract. What Lord Keith of Avonholm, one of the majority, said is of interest and highly persuasive. He said at pp 538-539:
From the foregoing English cases, from which we have quoted extensively, it will be appreciated, readily, that the proper approach in interpreting the Societies Act is to discern from the totality of its provisions whether Parliament intended that an unincorporated association of individuals registered under s 4 thereof as a society should have legal personality such that the society is capable of having an identity separate and distinct from the members who comprise it such that the society is capable of suing or being sued in its registered name even without the aid of s 35(b) which provides that all societies registered under the Societies Act may sue or be sued in the name in which it was registered.
Before we examine the provisions of the Societies Act we should mention that the same approach taken in England has been taken in Canada. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc v Therien [1960] 22 DLR (2d) 1, the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting the Labour Relations Act 1954, of British Columbia, applied the Taff Vale case and held that a trade union in British Columbia could be sued in tort or contract for damages.
Reference should also be made to two local cases the learned judge referred to in his judgment. In the first, Workers` Party & Anor v Tay Boon Too & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 47 , Chua J at p 49 said, `The Societies Act does not create a body corporate. It creates an association of individuals which is given the right, inter alia, to sue or be sued in its registered name.` The question of whether the Workers` Party which was a society registered under the Societies Act could sue for a libel in its registered name was not an issue, nor was the issue `whether a registered society had the `quasi-corporate` personality or legal personality so as to have a reputation to protect and to sue for any defamation against it.` The Workers` Party failed in its action on other grounds. In the other,
The learned judge noted in his judgment:
The learned judge was not assisted by these two cases; we too are not assisted by them.
The only other local case that need be mentioned is Standard Chartered Bank v Chip Hong Machinery (S) Pte Ltd & Anor [1991] 2 MLJ 20 . In this case, the second defendants were registered as a society under what was then the Societies Ordinance and counsel for the second defendants conceded that the second defendants being an unincorporated society could not hold a tenancy but contended that they could not be precluded from claiming an equity in the premises. Coomaraswamy J at p 22 said:
Whether or not the second defendants` were persona legalis , they still could not hold immovable property and thus an interest in the immovable property, as, being an unincorporated association albeit registered under the Societies Ordinance, they could only hold such property through trustees. This is settled law but if authority be needed, see Jarrott v Ackerlay [1915] 113 LT 371.
Whatever the legislative history of the Societies Act and the necessity for its legislation in 1889, the fact remains that the Societies Act is the only statute in Singapore which provides for the registration and, through registration, the legalization of all unincorporated associations except for those unincorporated associations like trade unions which are the subject of special legislation and are excluded by paras (a)-(g) of the definition of `society` in s 2 of the Societies Act. An unincorporated association coming within the definition of `society` in s 2 and which is not registered under s 4(1) is deemed to be an unlawful society; see s 14.
The respondents come within the definition of `society` in s 2 of the Societies Act and are registered under s 4(1). It must follow that the respondents must have satisfied the requirements of s 4(2) and (3), otherwise they would not have been registered under s 4(1).
How then are the respondents who are an unincorporated association but are a registered society under the Societies Act to sue for libel in their own name? O`Connor J provided the answer in the EETPU case at p 1100. He said:
It is therefore necessary to examine the Societies Act to see whether it has conferred on an incorporated association registered as a `society` under the provisions of the Societies Act sufficient personality for it to sue in defamation. It would be too tedious to examine each and every section of the Societies Act. However, two sections of the Societies Act should be set out in full as their meaning is plain and obvious. They are ss 35 and 36: (b) every such society may sue or be sued in the name in which it was registered under
this Act; (c) a writ of summons or other legal process may be served on a society by serving it on an officer of the society, or by leaving it at, or sending it by registered post to, the registered address of the society; (d) except as otherwise provided in section 36, no judgment in any suit against a registered society shall be put into force against the person or property of any officer or member of the society but only against the property of the society; (e) any member who is in arrears of subscriptions which, according to the rules of the society, he is bound to pay, or who takes possession or detains any property of the society contrary to those rules, or who injures or destroys any property of the society, may be sued for the arrears or for the damage accruing from his wrongful possession, detention, injury or destruction of that property by and in the name of the society; (f) any member of the society who steals, purloins or embezzles any money or other
property, or wilfully and maliciously destroys or injures any property of the society, or forges any deed, bond, security for money, receipt or other instrument whereby the funds of the society may be exposed to loss, shall be subject to the same prosecution, and, if convicted, shall be liable to be punished in like manner as any person, not a member, would be subject and liable to in respect of the like offence; (g) in the absence of any specific provision in the rules of a society any number not less than three-fifths of the members for the time being resident in Singapore of the society may determine that it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at a time agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society and its claims and liabilities according to the rules of the society applicable thereto, and if none, then as the governing body finds expedient: Provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the members of the governing body or the members of the society, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the High Court, and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it thinks fit; (h) no society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members so resident as aforesaid have expressed a wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person or by proxy at a general meeting convened for the purpose. (2)
Where a society is required to give security for costs under subsection (1) and the amount of the security is not sufficient to pay the costs of the defendant - (a) the officers of the society who approved the institution of the action or legal proceeding; and (b) any person who, on subsequently becoming an officer of the society, does not take any reasonable measure for the purpose of seeking the discontinuance of the action or legal proceeding,
In addition s 4 of the Societies Act provides for the registration of a society and the grounds on which registration may be refused. These include situations where the rules of the society are insufficient to provide for its proper management and where the society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore. Section 7 provides for the voluntary dissolution of the society. Section 9 stipulates who may be an officer of the society. Section 19 provides for penalties for the misuse of money or property of the society by a member or officer. Section 24 states that the minister may order the dissolution of a registered society, inter alia, if it is used for unlawful purposes or if the society is being used for purposes incompatible with the objects and rules of the society or if the society has contravened any provision of the Societies Act. In the case of a dissolution under s 24, the property of
the society vests, by virtue of s 25 in the Official Assignee and any surplus after satisfaction of all its debts and liabilities and the costs of winding up the society shall be paid over to the members of the society unless the minister makes an order for the surplus to be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
From all of the above it is clear to us that an unincorporated association registered under the Societies Act as a `society` is very much like a registered trade union under the English Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. The `society` has a registered name and address which it may change, albeit only with the consent of the registrar. It has objects which it may pursue and it may set up branches. Section 35(a) specifically provides that it may hold moveable property through its trustees or governing body and although there is no specific provision regarding the holding of immovable property, we have no doubt that it can do so through trustees. Such property are considered to be a separate fund from the assets of the members, as can be seen from ss 19, 25 and 35. Sections 10, 12 and 36 envisage that the society may act through its agents and officers.
Last but not least by virtue of s 35(b) a society may sue or be sued in its registered name and by reason of s 35(d) where a judgment is obtained against a society, the judgment may only be put into force against the property of the society and not those of its officers or members. Furthermore by reason of s 36, a society commencing an action in its registered name can be ordered to furnish security for the costs of the defendant and only where the amount of the security is shown to be insufficient to pay the defendant`s costs will the officers of the society who approved the institution of the action be held jointly and severally liable for the defendant`s costs in excess of the amount of the security.
It is clear to us from the totality of the provisions of the Societies Act that an unincorporated association registered as a `society` under the Societies Act has sufficient legal personality such that in effect the provisions of the Societies Act have created a `near-corporation` or a `quasi-corporation`. In our judgment, and confining ourselves to the facts of this case, there is no reason why a registered society, may not sue or be sued for defamation. A registered society may have many activities and many objectives which it may pursue. In the words of Scott LJ in National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian & Ors `it has some existence, and is something.` It can be wounded and it is capable of having its own reputation. If it is able to pursue objectives and carry out activities, it is possible for defamatory statements to injure it in its ability to carry out such function. So also defamatory statements may directly affect the
society by causing a diminution in its funds and its ability to raise subscriptions. In the words of Lord Keith of Avonholm in Bonsor v Musicians` Union it has a collective identity which is distinct from that of its members at any moment in time. The members may change, but the registered society retains its permanent identity. Whether it is called a `near-corporation` or a `quasi-corporation` or having a `collective identity` distinct from its members for the time being or any other thing does not detract from the intention of Parliament to be gathered from the whole of the Societies Act which is to give an unincorporated association registered under the Societies Act as a `society` a legal persona.
It was contended before us that s 34(b) of the Societies Act was purely a procedural provision. That may well be so. In fact Chua J in Workers` Party v Tay Boon Too thought it was. But the question of whether a registered society can sue for defamation in its registered name is not decided by s 34(b) alone but by the combined effect of all the provisions of the Societies Act.
For the foregoing reasons we confirm the learned judge`s decision that the respondents, as a registered society under the Societies Act, have the necessary legal personality to sue for defamation in their registered name.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals with costs and direct that there shall be only one set of `getting up` fees for the two appeals. The security deposit for costs in each of the two appeals shall be paid out to the respondents to account of their costs.
Appeals dismissed.
Torts—Defamation—Meaning of words—Meaning of `cult`—Meaning ought to be pleaded and particulars given in support
Torts—Defamation—Justification—Whether justification made out on facts
Torts—Defamation—Fair comment—Elements of defence—Whether statements were statements of opinion or fact—Whether commentator required objective or subjective honest belief of truth of comments made
Torts—Defamation—Qualified privilege—Elements of defence—Whether mere communication to persons who had no legitimate interest in matter constituted excessive privilege
Torts—Defamation—Qualified privilege—Whether ordinary duty of newspapers to report matters of public interest sufficient
Torts—Defamation—Damages—Relevant factors
Impact, a religious publication associated with the main Protestant body of Christian faith in Singapore, published an article about two new religious groups: the Army of God (AOG) and the Central Christian Church (CCC). The article, entitled: `AOG & CCC - Are they Cults?`, contained, inter alia, pictorial representations and a list of the alleged beliefs, teachings and characteristics of the CCC.
The Impact article was picked up by The New Paper (TNP) and Lianhe Wanbao (Wanbao). TNP carried on its front page the headline `2 CULTS EXPOSED`, with the statement underneath `Christian groups warn of two new cults in Singapore. The Army of God and the Central Christian Church tend to "stretch the truth" and have "exclusive" practices, says one reverend `. The rest of the article was, apart from certain important statements, in substance a republication of what had been published in Impact. The Wanbao publication essentially contains the same statements made in the TNP publication.
CCC and their leader, John Louis (`Louis`), sued Impact, TNP and Wanbao for libel complaining that the references to the CCC as a cult and to Louis as a cult leader were defamatory of them. The defendants relied on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.
The trial judge held that all the defendants failed on the defence of justification. As for fair comment, he held that all the defendants succeeded on that defence except for TNP in respect of its front page headline. Regarding the defence of qualified privilege, he held that Impact succeeded, while TNP and Wanbao failed. CCC and Louis appealed. TNP and Wanbao also appealed.
Held , allowing the appeal by CCC and Louis as against TNP and Wanbao and dismissing their appeal as against Impact and also dismissing the appeal by TNP and Wanbao:
(1).The plaintiffs did not in their statements of claim plead the meaning of the word `cult` as understood by the ordinary reasonable reader. They ought to have pleaded such meaning and give particulars in support (see [para ] 19-20); Allsop v Church of England Newspaper Ltd [1972] 2 QB 161 followed.
(2).In ascertaining the meaning of the word `cult` it is important to bear in mind that Singapore is a secular state with diverse religions and there is a very high degree of religious tolerance. As such the meaning of the words in question was that understood by the ordinary man - the ordinary man in Singapore society. The ordinary man was fair-minded and had a reasonably open mind and tolerant view on religion. Every latitude would be allowed by him for differences in beliefs and doctrines in various religions. To the ordinary man, the word `cult` meant a religious group with teachings and practices that were abhorrent or harmful to society (see [para ] 25-27).
(3).On the facts, none of CCC`s teachings and practices could or would be considered by the ordinary man in Singapore as abhorrent or harmful to society. The defendants failed in the defence of justification (see [para ] 32).
(4).It was difficult to distinguish between an assertion of fact and a comment. At the end of the day much depended on how the defamatory statement was expressed, the context in which it was set out and the content of the entire article or passage in question. One should adopt a common sense approach and consider how the statement would strike the ordinary reasonable reader, ie whether it would be recognizable by the ordinary reader as a comment or a statement of fact (see [para ] 34-35).
(5).The defamatory statement in Impact was a comment and not an assertion of fact. However, the defamatory statements in the TNP and Wanbao were not recognisable as comments to the ordinary reasonable, fair-minded reader. They were assertions of fact (see [para ] 40-44).
(6).The matter commented on in Impact was one of public interest and sufficient facts had been proved for the purpose of the defence. For a defence of fair comment to succeed it was not necessary to prove each of the facts pleaded in support; all that was needed was to prove such of the facts as were sufficient to form the basis of a fair comment (see [para ] 46-47); Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345[1952] 1 All ER 501 followed.
(7).On the facts proved, a fair-minded person could honestly express the comments made in the Impact magazine. The requirement of honesty was an objective one and was one that a fair-minded person could honestly make given the proven facts, unless in making such statement the author was actuated by malice. In this case, the plaintiffs had not pleaded or relied on express malice on the part of Impact and as such were precluded from raising it (see [para ] 48-53); Merivale v Carson [1888] 20 QBD 275, Aaron v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR 62 , Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 1 QB 102 followed.
(8).The Impact magazine was a publication of the evangelical community and was circulated and distributed to members of that community and to churches. There was a duty on the part of the writer and publisher to publish the article and there was a corresponding interest on the part of the members of that community to receive it. The defence of qualified privilege succeeded. Where a libel was published on a privileged occasion and the publication did not go beyond the exigency of the occasion, the mere fact that the defamatory matter was communicated to persons who had no legitimate interest in the subject matter would not avoid that privilege (see [para ] 56-58); De Buse v McCarthy [1942] 1 KB 156 distinguished.
(9).TNP and Wanbao failed to show that they had the required duty to publish their articles on CCC solely on the basis that CCC`s activities were a matter of public interest and that it was their duty to report on such matters of interest. The burden was on them to show that there were circumstances that give rise to the duty and they had not discharged that burden. While it was rather unclear what `special facts` must be shown in order for a newspaper publication to succeed on the defence of qualified privilege, the requisite standard or test for such special facts was an onerous one. Given the alleged teachings and practices of CCC at the time of publication, the situation was not such as to meet the onerous standard required for the defence (see [para ] 57, 61-64); Aaron v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR 623 and Blackshaw v Lord [1983] 2 All ER 31 followed.
(10).Damages were compensatory and the amounts to be awarded to CCC and Louis should be fair and reasonable: not too much, nor too little. Taking into account all the relevant circumstances, a sum of $20,000 to CCC from each of the defendants, TNP and Wanbao, and a sum of $30,000 to Louis from TNP would be adequate damages (see [para ] 65); Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1998] 1 SLR 97 followed.
Cases Referred To (Precedents)
Cases):
Cur Adv Vult (delivering the judgment of the court): Before Warren LH Khoo J there were five actions for libel. Three of these were brought by the Central Christian Church (`CCC`) against the following persons respectively: (i) the editor, publisher and printer of the Impact magazine in respect of the publication of an article in the issue of the magazine for October/November 1991; (ii) the editor and publisher of The New Paper in respect of the publication of an article in the newspaper on 23 November 1991; and (iii) the editor and publisher of Lianhe Wanbao in respect of the publication of a similar article in the newspaper on 23 November 1991. The other two actions were brought by John Philip Louis (`JL`) against (i) the editor, publisher and printer of the Impact magazine, and (ii) the editor and
publisher of TNP respectively, in respect of the same publications. All the five actions were heard together before the learned judge and were dealt with together.
2.Arising from his decision six appeals have been brought. As all the appeals are interrelated, they were heard together and will be dealt with in this judgment. For convenience and easy reference, we shall refer to CCC as the plaintiffs, which expression, where the context so admits, includes JL. We shall refer to the editor, publisher and printer of the Impact collectively as ` Impact `; the editor and publishers of The New Paper as `TNP`; and the editor and publishers of Lianhe Wanbao as Wanbao and, where appropriate, all the defendants in the five actions collectively as the defendants.
3. Impact publication The Impact magazine is published bi-monthly and is a religious publication associated with the main Protestant body of Christian faith in Singapore. In the Oct/Nov 1991 issue Impact published an article about two religious groups: the Army of God (`AOG`) and CCC. On the front cover of the magazine, there is a picture of a figure in red with a white hood and on the front of the figure are the words `HOLY BIBLE`. The figure is holding a shepherd`s crook with the tip bearing a cross and leading a couple of sheep. Next to it are, among others, the words `AOG & CCC - Are they Cults?`. Inside the magazine are, inter alia, three articles. The first is headed `Satan`s Wily Schemes` with a pair of hooded figures, one holding a lighted candle, appearing below the heading. On the third page of the same article is another hooded figure holding a lighted candle. Two pages on, there appears the
second article with the heading in very bold print `AOG & CCC` in a specially shaded box, below which are the words `They`re Not What You Think`. In this article, there is a photograph of two hooded figures facing a young lady, against the background of an MRT station and the young lady is shown to be extending her hand to one of the hooded figures. The contents of this page and the next three pages concern only AOG. Immediately following this part of the article there appears another photograph of the two hooded figures and the young lady, and here the young lady is shown to be receiving something from the same hooded figure. Above the photograph are the three letters `CCC` and the ensuing content of this article concerns CCC. We shall call this part of the article as the `CCC article`. The CCC article covers substantially three pages. On the second page is a box containing a short article headed in bold print `Why People Join Cults`, and on the third page there appears the
same
pictorial representation as that appearing on the cover but in much reduced size and in black and white. Two pages further on, there appears the third article, headed `Who Cares About Heresies Anyway?` with two hooded figures, each holding a lighted candle appearing at the end of the article.
4.The plaintiffs complained that pictorial representation and the words `AOG & CCC - Are They Cults` appearing on the front cover of the magazine, the heading `AOG & CCC` and `They`re Not What You Think` in the second article and certain words in the CCC article are defamatory of them. We now quote below verbatim only those words in the CCC article which the plaintiffs complained were defamatory of them.
5.The CCC article begins with the statement: `You may meet them at MRT stations, inviting you to their home meetings` and would be told that CCC are part of the Church of Christ and that they, CCC, do everything exactly as the Bible says. In the midst of this paragraph is the photograph of the two hooded figures talking to a young lady who is shown to be receiving something from one of them. The article then goes on to give an account of the history and origins of the CCC, and says:
6.Below these words are the heading `What CCC Believes` and a sub-heading `Their Special Calling` and following that the article lists the various statements of the beliefs, teachings and practices of CCC. Under the heading of `What CCC believes`, it says: 1 2 Other churches are not true congregations until they are `reconstructed`.
and under the heading of `Their Teachings` the article says: 1 The group teaches baptismal regeneration and practices rebaptism. Only those baptised by the group are truly baptised. 2 The movement has a pyramid-type organisation, and expects total commitment to the leadership. One of their leaders was reported to have said: `Leadership is to be imitated, not evaluated`. 3 Members are to confess their sins to one another. All sins including sinful thoughts are to be confessed. 4 5 Members are encouraged to leave their homes and live communally. Boyfriend and girlfriend relationships tend to be guided, if not determined by the group and its leaders.
Immediately following is another section of the article under the heading: `Group Characteristics`, which asserts: 4 Control is very tight. The disciple has to report to the discipler exactly how he spent his time and who he was with.
7.Juxtaposed with the CCC article in the middle of the second page is a short article in a box entitled `Why People Join Cults` in which the author attempts to explain the reasons for cult membership. Essentially, the author`s view is that people join cults to satisfy certain `spiritual and psychological vacuums crying to be filled`. These needs, the author argues, are basically that of `Identity, Community and Significance`.
8.The article then recounted the experiences of two former members of the group. Both of them told much the same story. They were both from more mainstream churches. They decided to convert to CCC members, as they were persuaded by the warmth, openness and sincerity of their members. However, they found that they could not reconcile their own beliefs with the group`s teachings, beliefs and doctrines. This was especially so in the area of baptism as well as the group`s assertion that theirs was the only true church. Both also revealed that they had experienced some emotional difficulty in leaving the group. The article ends with the following in a slightly bold print:
9.The plaintiffs further complained that the heading of the second article bearing the words: `AOG & CCC` in bold prints and the words below: `They`re not what you think` and the two photographs with the two hooded figures and the young lady were defamatory of them. Finally, they complained that (i) the first article bearing the title: `Satan`s Wily Schemes` with the two hooded figures and the photograph on the next page with the hooded figure, and (ii) the third article bearing the title: `Who cares about HERESIES ANYWAY?` with the two hooded figures at the end, by reason of their juxtaposition with the CCC article, refer to them and are defamatory of them.
10.The article in the Impact magazine was picked up by TNP and Wanbao and they each published an article concerning AOG and CCC in their respective issues on 23 November 1991. Only the words which the plaintiffs complained of are set out below verbatim.
11. The New Paper publication On the front page of TNP is the headline in 2-inch bold type `2 CULTS EXPOSED`, above which are the words in a quarter inch bold type `THE ARMY OF GOD` and `THE CENTRAL CHRISTIAN CHURCH` and below the headline appears the following statement:
All these took up more than half the space of the front page.
12.Inside the newspaper at p 11 there appears the article with the title `Concern Over Two Cult Groups`. Next to it is a drawing of a man holding a mask with a book under his arm. He appears to be teaching a group of three persons. The man`s face exhibits a fierce expression while the mask that he holds out in front of him has a benign and kind countenance. The plaintiffs say that this drawing refers to CCC.
13.The article starts with the following paragraphs:
It then goes on to state that TNP`s interviews with pastors from three mainstream churches confirmed the concern expressed in the two magazines, the Impact and Methodist Messages . It quotes one reverend saying that he was concerned because of the AOG`s and CCC`s ideological differences with more established churches and the following:
A few paragraphs further down, under the heading: `CCC TRAITS`, the article says:
Under the heading: `WHAT THE MAGAZINES SAY`, it reports the following in respect of CCC: [middot] Other churches are not true churches until they are `reconstructed`. [middot] The movement expects members to be wholly committed to the leadership. One of its leaders was reported to have said: `Leadership is to be imitated, not evaluated. [middot] Members are encouraged to be totally transparent with one another. Members have to confess their sins to each other, including sinful thoughts. [middot] Members are encouraged to leave their homes and live together in a group. Boyfriend and girlfriend relationships tend to be guided, if not set, by the group and its leaders.`
14.In a box, in the middle of the page under the heading: `LEADERS OF THE CULTS`, is the following:
15. Wanbao publication The Wanbao in their issue of 23 November 1991 contained an abbreviated version of what was published by TNP. A translated version of the article reads as follows: [middot] Strict control. Members must disclose frankly who they are with, how they spend their time. [middot] Express with gusto. Show great zeal in prayer, no accompaniment of musical instruments in hymn singing.
16.In respect of these publications CCC instituted three actions for libel against Impact , TNP and Wanbao respectively. John Louis (`JL`) the leader of CCC who was referred to as the leader of the cult in the Impact magazine and the TNP newspaper instituted two separate actions against Impact and TNP respectively. The claims were resisted by the defendants and they raised three defences: (i) justification, (ii) fair comment on a matter of public interest, and (iii) qualified privilege.
17. The decision below Warren LH Khoo J held that the word `cult` is a pejorative term and that the references to CCC as a cult were defamatory of them. Turning to the defences he held that all the defendants failed in their defence of justification. As for fair comment, he held that all the defendants succeeded, except the headline appearing on the front page of the TNP publication. Regarding the defence of qualified privilege, he held that Impact succeeded, while TNP and Wanbao failed.
18. The appeals Against the decision of the learned judge CCC, JL, TNP and Wanbao have now appealed. Essentially CCC and JL appeal (in CA 248, 249, 250, 251 and 252 of 1997) against that part of the decision of the learned judge which decided the words complained of in the three publications were fair comment made on a matter of public interest and that the publication of the article in the Impact magazine was made on a privileged occasion. TNP and Wanbao appeal (in CA 247 of 1997) against that part of the decision of the learned judge which held that their defences of justification and qualified privilege failed.
19. Meaning of the words We turn first to the meaning of the words complained of. Although in their statements of claim the plaintiffs pleaded various alleged defamatory meanings of the words complained of, before us as it was before the learned judge, the meaning that they attributed to the words which they say are defamatory of them is that CCC are a cult and that JL is the leader of that cult. It is this meaning that the plaintiffs contend is the sting of the libel, and it is also this meaning that the defendants seek to justify. However, as the learned judge found and we agree entirely with him, the plaintiffs did not in their statements of claim plead the meaning of the word `cult` as understood by the ordinary reasonable reader. They ought to have pleaded such meaning and give particulars in support.
20.In Allsop v Church of England Newspaper Ltd [1972] 2 QB 161, where the words complained of as defamatory of the plaintiff were that the plaintiff had `preoccupation with the bent`. It was held by the Court of Appeal in England that the plaintiff ought to give particulars as to the meaning of those words. Lord Denning MR said at p 168:
21.The defendants in their pleadings relied on the definition of the word `cult` as found in Longman`s Dictionary of Contemporary English :
and sought to set out the various characteristics of a `cult` as understood by them which justified their reference to CCC as a cult and JL as the leader of that cult.
22.For completeness, we should also mention the following dictionary meanings. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives, inter alia, the following meanings of the word, cult: 1 Worship; reverential homage rendered to a divine being. 2 A system of religious worship, esp as expressed in ceremonies, ritual, etc.
The Webster`s New World Dictionary (3rd College Ed) at p 337 gives the following meanings: (1) `a system of religious worship or ritual, (2) a quasi-religious group, often living in a colony, with a charismatic leader who indoctrinates members with unorthodox or extremist views, practices, or beliefs`.
However, in this case, as in Allsop `s case, the dictionary meanings of the word are of no assistance. What is in issue here is the meaning of the word `cult` in the context of the articles as understood by the ordinary reasonable man in Singapore.
23.Defining the word `cult` is fraught with much difficulty because the word `cult` is such a value loaded word. What is a cult to a Christian may not be a cult to a Muslim; and indeed to an atheist, any religion could be a cult, because to someone who disbelieves in the existence of any God, worshipping a supernatural being and believing that that supernatural being is omniscient and omnipotent is or may be an `extreme doctrine and practice`. In this connection we agree with the observation of the learned judge at [para ] 25 of his judgment:
24.The learned judge defined cult as `a group with such extreme doctrine and practice that it should be shunned by right-thinking members of society`. He said at [para ] 36:
25.As stated in Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th Ed) (at [para ] 3.26), the law has to take into account that English words have different meanings in different places. What is not considered or considered as a `cult` in The United Kingdom, United States of America and Australia may not be the same here. So the question is what is the meaning of the word `cult` in Singapore. In ascertaining the meaning of the word `cult` it is important to bear in mind that Singapore is a secular state with divers religions and there is a very high degree of religious tolerance.
26.In the law of defamation, the meaning of the words in question is that understood by the ordinary man - the ordinary man in Singapore society. The ordinary man is fair-minded and has a reasonably open mind and tolerant view on religion. Every latitude would be allowed by him for differences in beliefs and doctrines in various religions. The ordinary man does not regard any group a cult merely because its beliefs and doctrines deviate to an extreme degree from the so-called orthodox or mainstream religion or faith. To him, terms like `orthodox` and `mainstream` are relative; so also is such deviation. Hence, to his mind a group with deviant religious beliefs or doctrines even to an extreme degree - and this, as we say is relative - from the so-called `orthodox` or `mainstream` religion would not be regarded a cult. Mere deviance of beliefs and doctrines would not be sufficient.
27.The starting point in our consideration as to the meaning of the word `cult` is that in Singapore society the word `cult` has a sinister connotation. The ordinary man on hearing that his son or daughter has joined a cult, whatever the religious persuasion of that cult may be, would feel very perturbed and alarmed. The question is then what is it in such group called a `cult` that raises such grave concern? Given that Singaporean society is multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious with very high degree of religious tolerance, any deviant religious beliefs or doctrines alone would, in our opinion, probably not cause such grave concern and anxiety. What really worries the ordinary man is the teachings and practices of the group rather than their religious beliefs and doctrines. The next question is: `What kind of teachings and practices would alarm the ordinary man?` The answer must be those teachings and practices that are abhorrent or harmful to society, and our
conclusion is that to the ordinary man the word `cult` means a religious group with teachings and practices that are abhorrent or harmful to society.
28.We agree with the learned judge that the word `cult` is a pejorative term and any reference to a religious group as a cult is clearly defamatory of that group. Such description of that group would tend to lower the group and its members in the estimation of the right-thinking members of the society generally. Such a group would be shunned and looked upon with contempt.
29. Justification We now turn to the defence of justification. The defendants relied on various facts and matters relating to the beliefs, teachings and practices of CCC in support of their defence. The learned judge found that most of the facts and matters relied on had been proved. The principal ones are as follows: (1) CCC believe and teach their members that their church is the only true church and that they do everything exactly as the Bible says. The other churches do not follow and teach what the Bible teaches and their adherents are not true Christians. These churches are spiritually dead and have to follow CCC`s ways to be `reconstructed`. (2) The essential teaching of CCC is that in order to be saved and to become a true Christian a person must be baptised by CCC or churches within their group. Baptism by any other church is invalid. Thus CCC rebaptise any person who wishes to become a member, even if he or she was
baptised
elsewhere other than by a church within their group. (3) In CCC every member has a discipler and the discipler himself has his own discipler and so on up the hierarchy. The discipler is a tutor, counsellor and a friend, all rolled into one; he meets his disciple or disciples on a regular basis and monitors and guides them on every aspect of his or their lives. Normally they meet once a week, studying bible and discussing what the disciple has done and what he intends to do with reference to his commitment to God and the church. (4) A disciple is taught to confess his sin or personal weakness and private thoughts to his discipler. His discipler might even ask about any other sins he has committed and whether he has overcome them. Where a discipler has more than one disciple, topics such as sins committed by one disciple may be discussed openly in the company of the other disciples. A disciple is taught to be open and share his life and thought with others. (5)
Sharing of faith is an important thing for the church and the discipler would be likely to ask his disciples what they have been doing in that area and how many people they have contacted and how many they would be likely to bring to the meeting. (6) If a disciple has difficulty fitting his church commitments with his own commitments in other areas of his life, such as family, work, business or education, his discipler would help him to plan his times so as to fit in everything within the time frame, and if there is difficulty in so doing, the commitment to the church takes priority. (7) The members of CCC who are unmarried are encouraged to meet members of opposite sex and to date and marry them. A member is not encouraged to form a relationship with a member of the opposite sex who is not a member of the church, unless the latter is encouraged to join the church, and failing that the member will be pressurized to break that relationship. (8) Submission to the
leadership is a norm in CCC. A disciple is expected to submit to the authority of disciplers and the leaders of the CCC. There is a pyramid type of leadership based on a hierarchical organizational structure, progressing from members upwards through various ranks of leaders to the leader evangelist at the top of the pyramid. Every leader down to the lowest level is directly answerable to another leader higher up in the pyramid until the top. (9) Recruitment activity is the most important commitment of every CCC member at every level. A member does it wherever and whenever there is an opportunity to do so: everyone who is not a member is a potential target, eg relatives, friends, business acquaintance. Once a week is set aside for members to do recruitment publicly, eg at MRT stations or on the streets. They usually approach people in their late teens and early thirties and primarily English educated. Members of the CCC are constantly expected to contact and convert others. (10) The evenings of most of the week of a member are taken up by church activities. He has `family night` in which he spends time explaining to his family the new found faith or attempting to convert members of the family who are not members of the church. As for the other evenings of the week, the member goes out evangelising, attends bible studies and prayer meetings, and meets his discipler. The whole weekend is virtually taken up with `relationship building`, such as group outings, group datings, group fun on Saturday and with bible study, fellowship and dinner on Sunday. In addition, there is a service in the afternoon, and there is also a service on Wednesday which a member must attend. Missing such service would cause great concern. With all these commitments, a member hardly has any time for himself. Where the requirements or demands of his job conflict with the commitments of the church, the member is required to adjust his working requirements to fit in with his
commitments to the church. Members of CCC are expected to put their involvement in the CCC`s activities above their work. Because of such heavy commitments, members become isolated from their families, relatives and friends. (11) When a member either for reasons that he cannot meet the constant demands of the church or for other reason decides to leave the church, his discipler and friends would try to dissuade him from so doing, and the member would then be told that leaving the CCC is like leaving and rejecting God and going over to Satan.
30.The learned judge having found these facts then proceeded to consider the defence of justification. He dealt with this by stating that in a system of trial by jury, the jury would decide this issue. In Singapore, where the judge performs both the function of the judge and jury, the judge must place himself in the position of a hypothetical or notional jury and try to come to an educated guess as to what such a jury would have decided. Such a notional jury would have some Christians and Christian sympathisers. However, they would only form the minority. He then decided that while the abovementioned minority jury members would certainly be convinced that CCC was a cult, they would have difficulty persuading their fellow jurors as they would not be unduly troubled by CCC`s teachings and practices. This is especially so given Singapore`s national creed of tolerance in our multi-religious society. He thus came to the conclusion that the notional jury would not find CCC to be
a cult, and held that the defence of justification failed.
31.With respect, we do not think that it is helpful to adopt such an approach. We have no jury system. All cases are decided by a judge alone without a jury and he decides all issues, whether of fact or law; and on issues of fact he decides them by examining the facts objectively and making the necessary findings for the purpose of his judgment. He does not place himself in the position of a hypothetical or notional jury and try to come to an educated guess as to what such a jury or a majority of them would have decided.
32.Reverting to the facts here, what we need to do is to examine them and consider whether on those facts the defendants have justified the meaning of the word `cult` as defined by us. Looking at the facts as proved we find that all that has been established is this. CCC are a very religious group - indeed extremely religious - making very heavy demands on their members in terms of time and commitments, and through the system of discipleship retain a firm hold on or control over their members, jealously guarding them against any outside influence. As a result of the heavy commitments, the members would inevitably be isolated from their families, relatives and friends. CCC carry out very intensive recruitment exercises at every turn with their members evangelizing, making contact with people, inviting them to join their church and seeking to convert them. They are somewhat bigoted in their beliefs and doctrines, and consider that their church is the only true one and their
way
is the only way to salvation. For that reason they refuse to recognize baptism conducted by other churches, except those churches within their own group. We find that none of their teachings and practices could or would be considered by the ordinary man in Singapore as abhorrent or harmful to society. The ordinary man may find that some of their teachings and practices rather disagreeable and would probably not commend them to anyone but would not consider that they are abhorrent or harmful to society. In our judgment, the defendants have failed in the defence of justification.
33. Fair comment Next, we turn to the defence of fair comment. There are four elements which the defendants must establish in order to succeed on the plea of fair comment: (i). the words complained of are comments, though they may consist of or include inference of facts; (ii). the comment is on a matter of public interest; (iii). the comment is based on facts; and (iv). the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.
See Jeyaretnam JB v Goh Chok Tong [1984-1985] SLR 516 , 522 and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd v Wright Norman & Ors [1994] 3 SLR 760 at p 770.
Distinction between fact and comment
34.The difficulty here is to distinguish between an assertion of fact and a comment. In dealing with this issue the learned judge held summarily (at [para ] 99) that a statement that a group is a cult is essentially a comment. That, with respect, is an over-simplification. Such a statement may be a statement of fact or a comment, depending on the manner in which the statement is made and the context in which it is made, and in determining this issue the whole of the article or passage in question has to be read and considered. Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th Ed) in [para ] 12.6-12.10 provides various propositions as guides in ascertaining whether a statement is one of fact or comment, but all of them, though helpful, are by no means decisive or conclusive. The learned editors say: 12.6 The distinction. it has been said that the sense of comment is `something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference,
conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc`. 12.7 Fact and comment: the significance of supporting facts If a defamatory allegation is to be defended as fair comment it must be recognisable by the ordinary, reasonable reader as comment and the key to this is whether it is supported by facts, stated or indicated, upon which, as comment, it may be based 12.8 Construction. While some indication of the supporting facts is necessary the ultimate question is how the words would strike the ordinary, reasonable reader and it is unlikely that any attempt to formulate general principles of construction will be much help 12.9 Context. In order to determine whether the words are fact or comment the judge or jury is confined to the context of the publication in respect of which the action is brought What is necessary is that language must be used which conveys to the reader that the defendant is commenting on what the writer of the article has said 12.10 Inferences of
fact as comment. It is clear that a comment may consist of an inference or deduction of fact; that is, an author can assert, as his comment on facts stated or referred to in what he publishes, some other fact the existence of which he infers or deduces from those facts. Thus, if the author sets out facts in relation to the plaintiff`s conduct and states that his inference from those facts is that the plaintiff must have been bribed so to act, his statement will fall within the defence, though it is possible in this situation that mere honesty on his part will not suffice.
35.At the end of the day much depends on how the defamatory statement is expressed, the context in which it is set out and the content of the entire article or passage in question. One should adopt a common sense approach and consider how the statement would strike the ordinary reasonable reader, ie whether it would be recognizable by the ordinary reader as a comment or a statement of fact. In this connection, it is helpful to look at some pronouncements made in decided cases to see how the courts have approached this vexing issue.
36.In Hunt v The Star Newspaper Co, Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309, 319-320 Fletcher Moulton LJ said:
37.In the Australian case of Smith Newspapers Ltd & Anor v Becker [1932] 47 CLR 279, the plaintiff sued the defendants for libel in respect of an article published in the defendant`s newspaper which defamed the plaintiff by calling him, inter alia, a `German quack`. The High Court held, inter alia, that the libellous statement was an assertion of fact. Evatt J said at p 302:
38.Another clear pronouncement on statements recognizable as comment is found in the following passage of the judgment of Jordan CJ of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Goldsbrough v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd & Anor [1934] 34 SR 542, 531:
39.In London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, the defendant produced a play, The Honourable Gentleman, at Her Majesty`s Theatre, London, and over the last few months the weekly takings had fallen rather considerably. He received from the lessee of the theatre, who had given him a licence to stage the play, a letter stating that in view of the poor takings the licence granted to him to stage the play at the theatre might have to be terminated. Immediately after receipt of that letter he also received letters from four artists giving the required notices terminating their appearances at the play. He replied to each of the four artists suggesting that there was a plot to close the run of his play. The actual words used in the letter was that the addressee was `a party to what [appeared] to be a plan to close the run of The Right Honourable Gentleman`. He was sued for libel by those whom he
accused of being involved in the plot, and he raised, inter alia, the defence of fair comment. The trial judge held that the defence of fair comment was not available, as the matter was not a matter of public interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that although the matter was one of public interest, the defence of fair comment, nonetheless, failed, as the defamatory statement was not a comment but an assertion of fact. Edmund Davies LJ in rejecting the argument that the defamatory part of the letter was a comment said at p 398:
40.We now revert to the publications before us. We need to consider separately the publication in the Impact magazine and those in the newspapers of TNP and Wanbao. Although the publications by TNP and Wanbao in their respective newspapers were derived from what was published in the Impact magazine, the manner in which those articles were written was different. What appears in one publication as a comment may well appear in another or a subsequent publication dealing with the same subject matter as an assertion of fact.
41.In the Impact magazine the only direct reference to CCC as a cult is found on the front cover where the following question is posed `AOG & CCC - Are They Cults?` next to the pictorial representation which we have described. Nowhere in the CCC article is there any statement that CCC are a cult. The contents of the article and in particular, that part of the article which the plaintiffs complained of, set out the beliefs and teachings of CCC. Juxtaposed with the CCC article is a short article in a box with the heading `Why People Join Cults`, but the content of the article makes no reference to CCC. The inference drawn from the front cover, the content of the CCC article and the juxtaposition of the article `Why People Join Cults` with the CCC article is clearly that CCC are a cult and that JL is the leader of that cult. In our judgment, looking at the article as a whole (including the front cover) the reference to CCC as a cult and JL as the
leader
of that cult is a comment and not an assertion of fact.
Publication in TNP
42.The publications by TNP and Wanbao in their newspapers pose some difficulty. We consider first the publication of TNP. On the front page of the newspaper are the words in big bold print: `2 CULTS EXPOSED`. On top of these bold prints are the names of the two groups in lesser print: `THE ARMY OF GOD` and `THE CENTRAL CHRISTIAN CHURCH` and immediately below the big bold print are the words: `Christian groups warn of two new cults in Singapore. The Army of God and the Central Christian Church tend to "stretch the truth" and have "exclusive" practices, says one Reverend.` The article at p 11 of the newspaper has the heading in bold print: `Concern over two cult groups` and next to it is a pictorial representation consisting a man holding a mask depicting a benign and kind face and behind the mask is a hard and fierce looking face. The man is shown to be teaching or instructing three persons. The article commences with the
following paragraphs:
On the same page there also appears a short article contained in a box with the heading: `LEADERS OF THE CULTS` and that article states that JL is the leader of CCC and that he was converted and trained while he was studying in London and was sent to Singapore to start the group. The rest of the article is, in substance, a republication what has been published in the Impact.
43.These several statements must be read in the context of the entire article including the front page, and the article must be read as a whole. No doubt the statements we have quoted are supported by facts and matters stated in the article; but the question is whether these facts and matters support the statements as assertions of facts or as comments. That obviously must depend on the nature of those statements and the manner in which the statements are expressed. Reading the statements in their proper context, we have difficulty in accepting that they are comments and not assertions of fact. To the ordinary reasonable reader, who is fair-minded, these statements are not recognisable as comments. In our judgment, the severed defamatory statements in TNP referring to CCC as a cult and JL as a leader of that cult are plain assertions of fact and not comments.
Wanbao publication
44.The Wanbao publication contains equally clear statements of fact to the effect that CCC are a cult. At the risk of repetition, we set out again the publication which is as follows: (1). Two more religious cults discovered recently. Christian churches urge members to be wary. The two cults are the Army of God and Central Christian Church (2). One reverend said he was concerned because of the cults` ideological differences with the more established churches. They always emphasize that they are the `true believers` and that others are not (3). These two cult organisations not only have an impact on some of the churches in Singapore but it is also possible that they have influence in some mission schools.
What is even more obvious is that Wanbao hardly set out any facts in support of the statements. In our judgment, the statements in Wanbao are, a fortiori, assertions of fact and not comments.
45.It follows from what we have decided that the defence of fair comment is not available to TNP and Wanbao. Their defence of fair comment therefore fails.
46.We now revert to the defence of fair comment in relation to the Impact publication, and consider whether the remaining three elements have been established. On the second element, ie the matter commented on is one of public interest, it is not in dispute that the subject matter of publication is a matter of public interest. The learned judge held that it is a matter of public interest, and we agree with him entirely.
47.Turning to the facts or matters pleaded in support of the comment the learned judge found that they had been proved, with only one or two exceptions. In our opinion, those facts or matters that had been proved are sufficient for the purpose. For a defence of fair comment to succeed it is not necessary to prove each of the facts pleaded in support; all that is needed is to prove such of the facts as are sufficient to form the basis of a fair comment. Lord Porter in Kemsley v Foot [1952] A C 345, 358 said:
In our opinion, the third element has been established by Impact.
48.We now turn to the question whether on the facts as proved a fair-minded person could honestly express the comment as was expressed by Impact . The test is an objective one. In Merivale v Carson [1888] 20 QBD 275, 280-281 Lord Esher MR said:
49.In Aaron v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR 623 at p 650, this court said:
50.On the facts proved, we are of the opinion that a fair-minded person could honestly express the comments made in the Impact magazine.
51.Before us, counsel for CCC argues that Mrs Carpenter (the writer of the article in the Impact magazine) did not honestly believe what she wrote and that the fourth element required by the defence of fair comment has not been established. However, the word `honestly` here is used in an objective sense. The fourth element requires the comment to be one that, objectively speaking, a fair-minded person can honestly make given the proven facts, unless in making such statement the author is actuated by malice. In this case, the plaintiffs have not pleaded or relied on express malice on the part of Impact.
52.We are reinforced in our views by the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 1 QB 102. There, it was contended before the court that no comment could be fair, unless it is the honest opinion of the person making the comment. It is not enough for the view expressed to be one which an honest man could hold; the defendant must hold the view himself. As such, since the burden is on the defendant to prove fair comment, there must be some evidence that the comment represents his own honest view. After considering extensive authorities, Lloyd LJ held at p 119 that: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though
it
can consist of or include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any fair-minded man honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was actuated by malice.
53.In this case, as the plaintiffs have not pleaded express malice, they are precluded from raising any such arguments. In our judgment, the defence of fair comment by Impact succeeds.
54.We should mention that Telnikoff went on appeal to the House of Lords and the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed, but on another point, and what was said by Lloyd LJ (which we have quoted above) remain intact: Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343.
55.The plaintiffs also rely on the hooded figures in the magazine. We agree with the learned judge that one must look at the pictures in the context of the articles in which they appear as a reasonable reader would do and bear in mind that this is a publication to the religious community. The learned judge held that they are exaggerations and dramatisations of the view of Impact that CCC are a cult and may mislead people. We agree.
56. Qualified privilege We consider first the defence of qualified privilege raised by Impact . Warren LH Khoo J held that in order for the defence of qualified privilege to succeed, it has to be shown that the maker of the comment had a legal, social or moral duty to publish to another person who had a corresponding interest to receive it. The learned judge was clearly right. In Adam v Ward [1971] AC 309, 334 Lord Atkinson said:
Turning to the case at hand Warren LH Khoo J held that the publication by Impact fulfilled the requirements for the defence. Impact had the requisite duty to publish comments on the plaintiffs as it was a publication of the evangelical community, and was circulated among members of that community. Its general readership had the requisite interest. He said at [para ] 154:
57.This finding is challenged by the plaintiffs. Their contention is that the mere fact that members of the public have access to the magazine, however small in number, destroys Impact `s privilege and they rely on the following passage in [para ] 14.65 of Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th Ed):
There is no dispute on the correctness of this passage but only on the application thereof to the facts of this case. We agree with the finding of the learned judge. In the words of the learned judge, the magazine is a publication of the evangelical community and is circulated and distributed to members of that community and to churches. In these circumstances there is a duty on the part of the writer and publisher to publish that article and there is a corresponding interest on the part of the members of that community to receive it. The mere fact that persons who are not members of such community could have access to the publication does not ipso facto destroy that privilege. Where a libel is published on a privileged occasion and the publication does not go beyond the exigency of the occasion, the mere fact that the defamatory matter is communicated to persons who have no legitimate interest in the subject matter will not avoid that privilege: see [para ] 14.73 of
58.Counsel for the plaintiffs refer to the case of De Buse & Anor v McCarthy & Anor [1942] 1 KB 156; but the facts there were vastly different. There, the clerk of a borough council sent out notices convening a meeting of the council to consider, inter alia, the report regarding the loss of petrol from one of the council`s depot which was defamatory of the plaintiffs. Included in the notice was a long agenda and a copy of the report. Not only was the notice posted at or near the door of the town hall where the meeting was to take place, but under the direction of the council and in accordance with long established practice it was also sent to various libraries in the borough where they were available for perusal by ratepayers and other frequenters of the libraries. The clerk and the council were sued for defamation and it was held by the Court of Appeal that the defence of qualified privilege
failed,
as the council had no duty or interest to communicate the report to the ratepayers; nor had the ratepayers any duty or interest to receive the communication. In our opinion, that case has no application here.
59.Turning to the defence of qualified privilege raised by TNP and Wanbao, Warren LH Khoo J held that the mass media`s right to make fair comment on a matter of public interest or the professional duty of journalists and editors to report on matters of public interest is insufficient to constitute the requisite duty of the commentator for the purposes of the defence. Furthermore, the newspaper-reader relationship is also not enough to form the relationship required by the defence. The learned judge could not find any special duty on the part of TNP and Wanbao to publish comments on CCC outside their normal professional duty as news reporters. Accordingly, he held that they failed on that defence. He said at [para ] 160:
60.TNP and Wanbao`s submission is simply that they have the requisite duty to publish on the CCC because of the following characteristics: (a). CCC were a controversial group. (b). They practised deception in order to conceal their identity so as to obtain registration with the Registry of Societies. (c). They carried out aggressive recruitment programme in public.
61.The law regarding the defence of qualified privilege concerning newspapers has been set out in Aaron v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR 623 at pp 651C- 652A-B where this court said:
The court further elaborated on the relevant factors at p 652:
62.So it is patently clear that TNP and Wanbao cannot show that they have the required duty to publish their articles on CCC solely on the basis that CCC`s activities were a matter of public interest and that it was their duty to report on such matters of interest. The burden is on them to show that there were circumstances that gave rise to the duty, and they have not discharged that burden.
63.While it is rather unclear what `special facts` must be shown in order for a newspaper publication to succeed on the defence of qualified privilege, the requisite standard or test for such special facts is an onerous one. Stephenson LJ in Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1 at p 27, [1983] 2 All ER 311 at p 327 said that the cases where the defence was established for newspaper publications were those:
And indeed the decided cases where the defence was successfully pleaded do bear this out. In Allbut v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1889] 23 QBD 400 it was held that the Medical Council had a social or moral duty to publish the name of a doctor who had been taken off the medical register. In Camporese v Parton (1983) 150 DLR (3d) 208, it was held that a published warning of possible food contamination from canning lids in a newspaper article fell within the ambit of the defence. In Perera v Peiris [1949] AC 1, it was held that the newspaper publication of an extract from a government report on bribery which accused the plaintiff of lack of candour was held to be privileged.
64.We find that, given the alleged teachings and practices of CCC at the time of publication, the situation was not such as to meet the onerous standard required for the defence. Allbut v General Council of Medical Education and Registration and Camporese v Parton were cases where the public was rightly warned of the risk of receiving medical treatment from a doctor who had been struck off the medical register and of consuming contaminated food respectively. Perera v Peiris concerned the alleged corruption by a government official. Accordingly TNP`s and Wanbao`s defence of qualified privilege fails.
65. Damages On the basis of what we have decided, it follows that TNP and Wanbao are liable in damages for the libel, and we now turn to the assessment of damages. On this exercise we have to bear in mind the following considerations. First, TNP and Wanbao did not in any way aggravate the hurt to the plaintiffs and there were no aggravating factors present which we should take into account. Secondly, both TNP and Wanbao are liable to CCC and there will be two awards of damages, and the totality of these awards will have to be taken into account. We also have to take into account that although TNP and Wanbao separately in their newspapers defamed CCC, the two publications are, in substance, similar and the stings in both the libel are the same. These considerations are relevant in assessing damages: see Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1998] 1 SLR 97 , 145-146 and 153-154. Damages are compensatory and the amounts to be awarded to CCC and JL should be fair and reasonable: not too much, nor too little. Taking into account all the relevant circumstances, we think that a sum of $20,000 to CCC from each of the defendants, TNP and Wanbao, and a sum of $30,000 to JL from TNP would be adequate damages.
66. Conclusion In the result, we dismiss CA 247, 249 and 251 of 1997 and allow CA 248, 250 and 252 of 1997. We order TNP and Wanbao each to pay to CCC damages in the sum of $20,000 making a total of $40,000, and TNP to pay to JL damages in the sum of $30,000, and affirm the order below dismissing CCC`s and JL`s claims against Impact.
67.On the question of costs, Impact should have their costs here and below. They succeeded in resisting the claim below and the appeals, CA 249 and 251 of 1997. Accordingly, we order CCC and JL to pay the costs of Impact here and below; however, only one set of costs for getting up and attendance in courts should be allowed. The deposits in court as security for costs in these two appeals are to be paid to them or their solicitors to account of costs.
68.We now turn to the remaining four appeals, namely, CA 247 of 1997 brought by TNP and Wanbao in which the respondents are CCC and JL; CA 248 and 250 of 1997 brought by CCC in which the respondents are TNP and Wanbao respectively, and CA 252 of 1997 brought by JL in which the respondents are TNP. As CCC and JL succeeded in their claims below and in their appeals, they should be entitled to costs here and below. Accordingly, we order TNP and Wanbao to pay the costs of CCC here and below and TNP to pay the costs of JL here and below; but there should be only one set of costs to both CCC and JL for getting up and attendance in courts. Further, for avoidance of any doubt, in so far as costs below are concerned, O 59 r 27(5) of the Rules of Court would apply. The deposits as security for costs in CA 248, 250 and 252 of 1997 are to be refunded to the appellants respectively or their solicitors and the deposit in court as security for costs in CA 247 of 1997 is to be paid to CCC
and JL or their solicitors to account of costs.
Appellant/Defendant
Cheong Yuen Hee and Christopher Bridges (Bridges Dhillon & Pnrs)
Respondents/Plaintiffs
Tan Chee Meng (Harry Elias & Pnrs)
The following provisions shall apply to all registered societies:
(a) the movable property of a society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested for the time being in the governing body of the society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal may be described as the property of the governing body of the society by their proper title;
An unincorporated member club, not being a partnership or legal entity, cannot sue or be sued in the club name (see [1916] 2 AC 15). The Karting Club of Singapore is unincorporated and consequently cannot be made a plaintiff to this action.
If the legislature has created a thing which can own property, which can employ servants, and which can inflict injury, it must be taken, I think, to have impliedly given the power to make it suitable in a court of law for injuries purposely done by its authority and procurement .
Central Christian Church and another appeal!21 NOV 1995!KARTHIGESU,LP
THEAN, CHAO HICK TIN![1996] 1 SLR 313!COURT OF APPEAL
SINGAPORE
COURT OF APPEAL - CIVIL APPEALS NO 60 AND 61 OF 1995
Judges
KARTHIGESU JA
LP THEAN JA
CHAO HICK TIN J
Date
21 NOV 1995
Citation
[1996] 1 SLR 313
Appellant/Defendant
Tan Chee Meng and Melvin Khoo (Harry Elias & Pnrs)
Respondents/Plaintiffs
Cheong Yuen Hee and Parambir Singh Sekhon (Bridges Choy & Lopez)
[T]he answer to the question depends on a true and natural interpretation of the provisions of the Societies Act and also on a review of the English case law which had to grapple with the legal personality of associations such as trade unions and friendly societies. Such associations were and are registered under English statutes which have analogous, though not exactly similar, provisions nor [sic] analogous statutory framework as those of our Societies Act. The underlying principles of the law of status and of persons, however, are the same.
The association consisted of some 6,200 members; it was unincorporated and consequently could not be made a defendant to the action in any capacity whatever. As an entity it could neither publish nor authorize the publication of a libel; and this appears to have been recognized before your Lordships` House, as the plaintiffs have consented to strike out the association from the action.
[T]he action for defamation is a personal matter because it is the reputation of the person which is defamed, and unless one can attach a personality to a body, it cannot sue for defamation. The best examples of this are found in the well-established law that a voluntary unincorporated association cannot maintain an action for libel on itself. Let me give an example. If one says of the Longbeach Anglers` Association that at the competition last Saturday they cheated, there is a defamatory statement; but the Longbeach Anglers` Association cannot maintain an action in respect of it. It may be that the individuals of the
association who were partaking in the competition could successfully sue by saying that, although they were not named, the defamatory statement pointed at them with sufficient clarity and was so understood by those who knew that they were members of that association to enable them to sue for libel; but the association could not do so, and it could not do so, as I see it, on the principle that it has no personality of its own which is capable of being defamed. It may well be that an unincorporated association cannot sue in its own name for anything, but I am restricting what I have to say to defamation. So you have got to have personality which is capable of being defamed before a plaintiff can bring an action for libel. [Emphasis added.]
The questions that I have to consider are what, according to the true construction of the Trade Union Acts, has the legislature enabled the trade unions to do, and what, if any, liability does a
trade union incur for wrongs done to others in the exercise of its authorized powers? The Acts commence by legalizing the usual trade union contracts, and proceed to establish a registry of trade unions, give to each trade union an exclusive right to the name in which it is registered, authorize it through the medium of trustees to own a limited amount of real estate, and unlimited personal estate `for the use and benefit of such trade union and the members thereof`; provide that it shall have officers and treasurers, and render them liable to account; require that annual returns be made to the registry of the assets and liabilities and receipts and expenditure of the society; provide that it shall have rules and a registered office, imposing a penalty on the trade union for noncompliance; and permit it to amalgamate with other trade unions, and to be wound up.
Now, although a corporation and an individual or individuals may be the only entity known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is competent to the legislature to give an association of individuals which is neither a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual a capacity for owning property and acting by agents, and such capacity in the absence of express enactment to the contrary involves the necessary correlative of liability to the extent of such property for the acts and defaults of such agents. It is beside the mark to say of such an association that it is unknown to the common law. The legislature has legalized it, and it must be dealt with by the courts according to the intention of the legislature.
Now, the legislature in giving a trade union the capacity to own property and the capacity to act by agents has, without incorporating it, given it two of the essential qualities of a corporation - essential, I mean, in respect of liability for tort, for a corporation can only act by its agents, and can only be made to pay by means of its property. The principle on which corporations have been held liable in respect of wrongs committed by its servants or agents in the course of their service and for the benefit of the employer ... is as applicable to the case of a trade union as to that of a corporation. If the contention of the defendant society were well founded, the legislature has authorized the creation of numerous bodies of men capable of owning great wealth and of acting by agents with absolutely no responsibility for the wrongs that they may do to other persons by the
use of that wealth and the employment of those agents. They would be at liberty ... to disseminate libels broadcast, or to hire men to reproduce the rattening methods that disgraced Sheffield thirty or forty years ago, and their victims would have nothing to look to for damages but the pockets of the individuals, usually men of small means, who acted as their agents.
It is quite true that a registered trade union is not a corporation, but it has a registered name and a registered office. The registered name is nothing more than a collective name for all the members. The registered office is the place where it carries on business. A partnership firm which is not a corporation, nor, I suppose, a legal entity, may now be sued in the firm`s name. And when I find that the Act of Parliament actually provides for a registered trade union being sued in certain cases for penalties by its registered name, as a trade union, and does not say that the cases specified are the only cases in which it may be so sued, I can see nothing contrary to principle, or contrary to the provisions of the Trade Union Acts, in holding that a trade union may be sued by its registered name.
[T]he power of suing and liability to be sued in the society`s name is clearly and necessarily implied by the provisions of the statutes. ... A registered trade union has an exclusive right to the name in which it is registered, a right to hold a limited amount of real estate and unlimited personal estate for its own use and benefit and the benefit of its members, the power of acting by its agents and trustees, and is liable to be sued for penalties, as it appears to me, in the society`s name. I am clearly of opinion that these and the provisions generally of the statutes imply a liability on the society to be sued in its trade union name, and a privilege of thus suing.
I think that a legal entity was created under the Trade Union Act 1871, by the registration of the society in its present name in the manner prescribed, and that the legal entity so created, though not perhaps in the strict sense a corporation, is nevertheless a newly created corporate body created by statute, distinct from the unincorporated trade union, consisting of many thousands of separate individuals, which no longer exists under any other name. The very omission from the statute of any provision authorizing and directing that it shall sue and be sued in any other name than that given to it by its registration appears to me to lead to no other reasonable conclusion than that in so creating it, it was intended by the legislature that by that name and by no other it should be known, and that for all purposes that name should be used and applied to it in all legal proceedings unless there was any other provision which
militated
against such a construction as, for instance, in the case of trustees by s 9 of the same Act, who hold real and personal property of the society.
My Lords, a careful study of the Act leads me to the conclusion that the Court of Appeal held, and rightly held, that trade unions are not corporations; but the court held further that, not being corporations, power to sue and be sued in their registered name must be conferred upon them; and further that the language of the statutes was not sufficient for the purpose. Upon this last point I differ from them. The Act appears to me to indicate with sufficient clearness that the registered name is one which may be used to denote the union as an unincorporated society in legal proceedings as well as for business and other purposes. The use of the name in legal proceedings imposes no duties and alters no rights: it is only a more convenient mode of proceeding than that which would have to be adopted if the name could not be used. I do not say that the use of the name is compulsory, but it is at least permissive.
That argument is, however, fallacious. That is a tertium quid. A trade union has many activities; it has some existence, and it is something. The omission of Parliament to christen it with some new generic name is immaterial, for Parliament has absolute sovereignty and can make new legal creatures if it likes. It is able, for instance, to create
a
persona juridica not previously known to the law, if it so chooses, or to clothe an existing association of natural persons with what may be called co-operative personality so as to give it the status of a persona juridica. In my view that is just what it did in 1871. It expressly assumed the possession by every trade union, when duly registered, of so many of the main attributes of judicial personality that I find any other inference of the intention of Parliament impossible.
These illustrations from the Act of 1871 are, in my opinion, conclusive of the intention of Parliament to attribute legal personality to trade unions, and that quality or characteristic must of necessity connote the general power to act, or, in other words, to do at any rate many of those things which are inherent in the legal concept of personality.
That decision involves, to my mind, that a registered trade union is recognized by the law as a body distinct from the individuals who from time to time compose it. It is not a corporation; but it is very much like one. The association is not merely the aggregate of the persons who compose it, and the presence of the corporate fiction is not necessary to secure its individuality. In an age of neologism it might be called a `near-corporation.`
It being assumed that a trade union can sue in tort, I see no ground for excluding the action of defamation. The attack made in the present case, the merits of which are of course in no way before the court, is a sufficient illustration of the disintegration of a trade union which might be produced by unjustifiable libels uncontrolled by the fear of action in the King`s courts.
My Lords, I think that the decisions of this House show that, in a sense, a registered trade union is a legal entity, but not that it is a legal entity distinguishable at any moment of time from the members of which it is at that time composed. It remains a voluntary association of individuals but it is capable of suing and being sued in its registered name; it holds property, through trustees, against which a creditor holding a decree against it could levy
execution; it acts by agents; and it has other rights and is subject to other liabilities set out in the Trade Union Acts. It differs from an unincorporated association in that it is unnecessary to consider who were the members at any particular time. For instance, it is immaterial who were the members at the time that any cause of action arose, or what members have joined the union since the cause of action arose. The registered trade union may be said to assume a collective responsibility for all members past, present and future, in respect of any cause of action for which it may be made liable, irrespective of the date of the cause of action. On the other hand, the judgment creditor can look only to the funds of such a trade union to satisfy his debt and, to the extent to which these may be augmented from time to time by contributions of members, whether new or old, they will still be available for the unsatisfied judgment creditor. These are important attributes, or characteristics of a registered trade union which, in my opinion, differentiate it from other voluntary associations and may entitle it to be called a legal entity, while at the same time remaining an unincorporated association of individuals. As an association, its membership is constantly changing, but as a registered trade union, it has a permanent identity and represents its members at any moment of time. It would not, I think, be wrong to call it a legal entity.
An unincorporated member club, not being a partnership or legal entity, cannot sue or be sued in the club name. The Karting Club of Singapore is unincorporated and consequently cannot be made a plaintiff to this action.
Counsel for the club, P Suppiah, failed to draw the court`s attention to the express provisions under s 35(b) of the Societies Act and it was conceded before me that for this reason the defendants in the present case could not rely on it.
However, the second defendants` claim that they have an equity in the upper floor and therefore a defence to the plaintiffs` claim for possession was wholly untenable. In the first place, the second defendants could not claim an equity in the upper floor of the premises for the same
reasonthey could not hold a tenancy, namely, that they had no legal personality as they were only a composite entity of fluctuating content and not a persona legalis: see Ang Bock Chwee`s case [1982] 1 MLJ 174 and Vengadasalam`s case [1985] 2 MLJ 449 .
The answer on the cases is, I think, now beyond dispute. It is that the necessary personality must be found in some statute, or alternatively, in some grant which enables one to say of an unincorporated body that it has a sufficient personality which it is entitled to protect by bringing an action in libel.
Section 35
The following provisions shall apply to all registered societies:
(a) the movable property of a society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested for the time being in the governing body of the society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal may be described as the property of the governing body of the society by their proper title;
Section 36
(1) Where a registered society or any of its officers purporting to act on its behalf is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the society or the officer will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.
shall be jointly and severally liable for any part of the costs awarded against the society which, after deducting the amount of the security, remains unsatisfied after one month from the date the costs became payable.
Central Christian Church and other appeals!28 AUG 1998!LP THEAN,KARTHIGESU,LAI KEW
CHAI![1999] 1 SLR 94!COURT OF APPEAL
SINGAPORE
COURT OF APPEAL - CIVIL APPEAL Nos 247-252 OF 1997
Judges
LP THEAN JA
KARTHIGESU JA
LAI KEW CHAI J
Date
28 AUG 1998
Citation
[1999] 1 SLR 94
Appellant/Defendant
Harry Elias SC, Tan Chee Meng and Doris Chia (Harry Elias & Partners)
Respondents/Plaintiffs
Cheong Yuen Hee and Sim Lin Piah (Toh Tan & Partners)
Daniel John and Robin Lim (Lim Ang & Partners)The Singapore group is led by `evangelist` John Luis [sic]. John was a Malaysian who was studying in London. After his conversion in London, he was trained by the group. Later he was sent to start the work in Singapore.
Attempts to interview the leaders of both the Army of God and the Central Christian Church were not successful.
Christian groups warn of two new cults in Singapore. The Army of God and the Central Christian Church tend to `stretch the truth` and have `exclusive` practices, says one Reverend. One of them is known for practising war cries [aelig ] members are told to shout and not talk softly to the devil/ Page 11.
Two new Christian groups described as cult groups have sprung up in Singapore, say a few Christian organisations
The groups in question are the Army of God (AOG) and The Central Christian Church (CCC).
The AOG and CCC tend to `stretch the truth` and have `exclusive practices`. In addition `they imply that they are the TRUE believers and the other churches are not`.
Tight control: A disciple must tell the group exactly how he spent his time and who he was with.
LEADER OF CCC
John Luis, [sic] a Malaysian, was converted and trained by the group while he was studying in England. He was later sent to Singapore to start the group here said Impact.
Two more religious cults have recently been discovered in Singapore. Local Christian churches have warned their members to be wary. The two cult organisations are the Army of God (AOG) and the Central Christian Church (CCC). Local Christian publications, Impact and the Methodist Messages, have uncovered their existence and activities. Christian church sources in interviews have expressed worries about new cults engaging in harmful activities here.
One reverend said he was concerned because of the differences of the cults` beliefs from those of the more established churches. They always emphasise that they are the `true believers` and that others are not. They
always regard themselves highly, they have extreme views and they reject others
These two cult organisations not only have an impact on some of the churches in Singapore; it is also possible that they have influence in some mission schools
According to reports, the new cults have these characteristics.
CCC:
In this case we have the words `pre-occupation with the bent.` What does the word `bent` mean in this context? It is not used in any of the ordinary meanings attributed to it. If you look at a dictionary you will not get any help. The word `bent` is there given in the sense of a person having a `bent` towards science or literature. That is not the meaning here. It is sometimes used as `bent,` meaning curved or crooked, like a `bent` stick. That is not the meaning here. Another meaning given by the dictionary to `bent` is a name given to a grass of a
reedy habit. That does not fit either. No dictionary meaning fits into this sentence. `Bent` is used here as a piece of slang. It has no precise meaning. It has no meaning which is commonly understood. It may have acquired a particular meaning among some group or other of persons. But, if so, what is it? It may mean only something unusual, something out of the ordinary, or out of line - which would not be defamatory. It may mean something crooked or perverted in a sexual sense, or in a financial sense, or it may be an even worse sense - which would be defamatory. I do not know what meaning a jury would attribute to it. Each of them might have a different view.
Seeing that the words may be grossly defamatory, or only slightly defamatory, or not defamatory at all, I am clearly of opinion that the plaintiff should give particulars saying what is, or are, the meaning, or meanings, which he says that the words bear.
A group of people believing in a particular system of religious worship, with its special customs and ceremonies.
unlike a word like `thief` or `murderer`, the word `cult` is not susceptible of one generally accepted meaning. A scholar might classify Christian or pseudo-Christian religious groups - in a sort of church-sect-cult continuum, and reserve the term `cult` to the extreme end of a scale of deviation from the mainstream. A person in an orthodox Christian faith might consider almost any group outside his religious orthodoxy
as a cult. And then there are also the most notorious violent and destructive groups, such as the ones that led to the Jonestown and Waco tragedies. Probably everyone, Christian or not, would regard them as cults.
Mr Tan, for the defence, as a back-up position as it were, submitted that a group could also be a cult if its doctrine and practice deviate to an extreme degree from the orthodox mainstream religion. It seems to me that this alternative meaning, although not spot on, is closer to the meaning that one should attribute to the word as used in the context of the article. Doing the best I can, I find that the imputation of the word `cult` in the context is that the CCC is a group with such extreme doctrine and practice that it should be shunned by right-thinking members of society.
In the first place, comment in order to be justifiable as fair comment must appear as comment and must not be so mixed up with the facts that the reader cannot distinguish between what is report and what is comment: see Andrews v Chapman (1853) 3 C & K 286. The justice of this rule is obvious. If the facts are stated separately and the comment appears as an inference drawn from those facts, any injustice that it might do will be to some extent negatived by the reader seeing the grounds upon which the unfavourable inference is based. But if fact and comment be intermingled so that it is not reasonably clear what portion purports to be inference, he will naturally suppose that the injurious statements are based on adequate grounds known to the writer though not necessarily set
out by him. In the one case the insufficiency of the facts to support the inference will lead fair-minded men to reject the inference. In the other case it merely points to the existence of extrinsic facts which the writer considers to warrant the language he uses. In this relation I must express my disagreement with the view apparently taken by the Court of
Queen`s Bench in Ireland in the case of Lefroy v Burnside 4 LR Ir CL 556, where the imputation was that the plaintiffs dishonestly and corruptly supplied to a newspaper certain information. The court treated the qualifications `dishonestly` or `corruptly` as clearly comment. In my opinion they are not comment, but constitute allegations of fact. It would have startled a pleader of the old school if he had been told that, in alleging that the defendant `fraudulently represented,` he was indulging in comment. By the use of the word `fraudulently` he was probably making the most important allegation of fact in
the whole case. Any matter, therefore, which does not indicate with a reasonable clearness that it purports to be comment, and not statement of fact, cannot be protected by the plea of fair comment.
In order to substantiate such a defence [ie defence of fair comment], the defendants had to show that their description of the plaintiff as a `German Quack` was published as and for an expression of their opinion about him. But I am satisfied that, seen in their true relation to the article, the words `German Quack runs riot on the Murray Flats` would be understood by a reader of the article as meaning, not that Smith`s
Weekly were merely expressing their opinion that Becker was a `quack` but that Smith`s Weekly asserted that such was a correct description of him; in other words, asserted as a fact that he was a `German Quack`. No doubt, the reader of the article would also gather that the writer was of opinion that Becker was a quack. But it would appear to him also that the writer did not regard such characterization as a matter open to any debate, but as a perfectly accurate portrayal of a fact.
For the defence [of fair comment] to succeed, it is essential that the whole of the words in respect of which it is relied on should be comment, that they should be fair, and that they should be on a matter of public interest. It must be indicated with reasonable clearness by the words themselves, taking them in the context and the circumstances in which they were published, that they purport to be comment and not statements of fact; because statements of fact, however fair, are not protected by this defence. In other words, it must appear that they are opinions stated by the writer or speaker about facts, which are at the same time presented
to, or are in fact present to, the minds of the readers or listeners, as things distinct from the opinions, so that it can be seen whether the opinions are such that they can fairly be formed upon the facts: Myerson v Smith`s Weekly Publishing Co Ltd 24 SR 20 at 26-27; Cole v Operative Plasterers` Federation 28 SR 62 at 67-68.
[T]he effect of Mr Duncan`s detailed analysis of the offending letter was to invite this court to bring to its interpretation a subtlety and perspicacity well beyond that reasonably to be expected of the ordinary reader whom the defendant was obviously aiming at by holding his Press conference, and to ignore the obviously fair and commonsense test propounded by Fletcher-Moulton LJ in Hunt v Star Newspaper
Co
Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309, 319. And whatever degree of subtlety be applied in its interpretation, in my judgment the words complained of were clear assertions of facts and the judge should have so ruled
TWO new Christian groups described as cult groups have sprung up in Singapore, say a few Christian organisations. And these organisations have warned their members about it.
The groups in question are The Army of God (AOG) and The Central Christian Church (CCC). Their existence and activities were highlighted in two Christian magazines, Impact and Methodist Messages.
In the present case, for instance, the substratum of fact upon which comment is based is that Lord Kemsley is the active proprietor of and responsible for the Kemsley Press. The criticism is that that press is a low one. As I hold, any facts sufficient to justify that statement would entitle the defendants to succeed in a plea of fair comment. Twenty facts might be given in the
particulars and only one justified, yet if that one fact were sufficient to support the comment so as to make it fair, a failure to prove the other nineteen would not of necessity defeat the defendants` plea. The protection of the plaintiff in such a case would, in my opinion, be, as it often is in cases of the like kind, the effect which an allegation of a number of facts which cannot be substantiated would have upon the minds of a jury who would be unlikely to believe that the comment was made upon the one fact or was honestly founded upon it and accordingly would find it unfair.
What is the meaning of a `fair comment`? I think the meaning is this: is the article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be, would say of the work in question? Every latitude must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and then an ordinary set of men with ordinary judgment must say whether any fair man would have made such a comment on the work. It is very easy to say what would be clearly beyond that limit; if, for instance, the writer attacked the private character of the author Mere exaggeration, or even gross exaggeration, would not make the
comment unfair. However wrong the opinion expressed may be in point of truth, or however prejudiced the writer, it may still be within that prescribed limit. The question which the jury must consider is this - would any fair man, however prejudiced he may be, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said of the work which is criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must find for the plaintiff; If you are not satisfied that it does, then it falls within the allowed limit, and there is no libel at all.
We refer to the very concise and oft-quoted passage of Diplock J`s direction to the jury in Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743, at p 749:
` I will remind you of the test once more. Could a fair-minded man, holding a strong view, holding perhaps an obstinate view, holding perhaps a prejudiced view - could a fair-minded man have been capable of writing this? That is a totally different question from the question: Do you agree with what he said?`
The essential thing is the honest opinion of a fair-minded person and in this connection every allowance or latitude must be given for any prejudice and exaggeration entertained by such a fair-minded person.
My conclusion is that the law is correctly stated in Duncan & Neil on Defamation (2nd Ed, 1983) p 57, para 12.02:
In the light of the present case I would add a rider, already implicit in paragraphs (a) to (e), that the absence of honest belief in the truth of the comment is relevant to paragraph (e), and not otherwise. Thus the burden of proof in the present case that the letter did not represent the defendant`s genuine views lay on the plaintiff. It was not incumbent on the defendant to give evidence as to his state of mind.
A privileged occasion is an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest, or a duty, legal, social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential.
The Impact magazine, a publication of the evangelical community, is targeted at people who attend churches. It is distributed mainly at churches and Christian book rooms. Non-Christians would not come into contact with it, unless they are receptive to the faith and perhaps get the magazine from friends. At the time of the publication of the issue complained of, it had a print run of about 6,000 copies, 3,000 of which were for subscribers and the balance sold at churches and book rooms, the actual sale being about 1,000
copies. So, in short, it is a publication of the evangelical community; it is intended to be circulated, and is circulated, among members of that community.
14.65 Publication to uninterested persons. It follows from the fundamental requirement of reciprocity of duty and interest that publication to a person who does not share in this reciprocity is not generally privileged. As a general rule therefore the defendant should be careful to make his communication only to those persons who have a legitimate interest or duty in relation to the subject-matter. The fact that a communication between A and B is privileged does not justify A in making the communication in a manner, or at a time, which would necessarily involve its publication to other persons who have no such interest
or duty, and no privilege would prima facie attach to any such publication.
In respect of The New Paper and the Wanbao, I do not think, therefore, that there are special circumstances giving rise to a duty for the purpose of the defence of qualified privilege. The defence fails on
qualified privilege.
Generally, qualified privilege is available to newspapers as much as to any other person. Privilege for publication in the press of information of general public interest is limited to cases where the publisher has a legal, social or moral duty to communicate. The law does not recognize an interest in the public strong enough to give rise generally to a duty to communicate in the press; such a duty has been held to exist on special facts, and there is no general `media privilege at common law`
In London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] 1 WLR 607, Cantley J said, at p 619:
`The cases to
whichIhave referred show a uniformity of approach. In my view the privilege for publication in the press of information of general public interest is confined to cases where the defendant has a legal, social or moral duty to communicate it to the general public, or does so in reasonable self-defence to a public charge, or in the special circumstances exemplified by Adam v Ward [1971] AC 309.
A duty will thus arise where it is in the interests of the public that the publication should be made and will not arise simply because the information appears to be of legitimate public interest.`
Along with the duty to communicate is a corresponding interest to receive such information on the part of the public
In addition, the duty must be a duty to publish to the public at large and the interest must exist
in the public at large to receive the publication. It is insufficient if only a section of the public is concerned with the subject matter of the publication. In Blackshaw v Lord & Anor [1984] QB 1 Stephenson LJ said, at p 26:
` There must be a duty to publish to the public at large and an interest in the public at large to receive the publication; and a section of the public is not enough.
The subject matter must be of public interest; its publication must be in the public interest. That nature of the matter published and its source and the position or status of the publisher distributing the information must be such as to create the duty to publish the information to the intended recipients, in this case the readers of the Daily Telegraph.`
And Dunn LJ said, at p 35:
` The public must have a legitimate interest in receiving the information contained in it, and there must be a correlative duty in the publisher to publish, which depends also on the status of the information which he receives, at any rate where the information is being made public for the first time `
by whom and to whom, when, why and in what circumstances the publication is made, and whether these things establish a relation between the parties which gives rise to a social or moral duty, and the consideration of these things may involve the consideration of questions of public policy. It does not follow that publication of all matters of public interest is in the public interest such that it would give rise to a duty to publish them. The right of a publisher of a newspaper to report truthfully and comment fairly on matters of public interest must not be confused with a duty of the sort that gives rise to an occasion of qualified privilege: per Cartwright J in The Globe And Mail Ltd v Boland (1960) 22 DLR (2d) 277 at 280-281.
extreme cases where the urgency of communicating a warning is so great, or the source of the information so reliable, that publication of a suspicion or speculation is justified; for example where there is danger to the public from a suspected terrorist or the distribution of contaminated food or drugs.